Abstract. We focus on the implementation and security aspects of cryptographic protocols that use Type 1 and Type 4 pairings. On the implementation front, we report improved timings for Type 1 pairings derived from supersingular elliptic curves in characteristic 2 and 3 and the first timings for supersingular genus-2 curves in characteristic 2 at the 128-bit security level. In the case of Type 4 pairings, our main contribution is a new method for hashing into G2 which makes the Type 4 setting almost as efficient as Type 3. On the security front, for some well-known protocols we discuss to what extent the security arguments are tenable when one moves to genus-2 curves in the Type 1 case. In Type 4, we observe that the Boneh-Shacham group signature scheme, the very first protocol for which the Type 4 setting was introduced in the literature, is trivially insecure, and we describe a small modification that appears to restore its security.
Introduction
Bilinear pairings have become an extremely useful instrument in the cryptographer's toolbox. Initial breakthroughs such as the one-round tripartite key agreement protocol of Joux [23] and a practical solution to the problem of identitybased encryption by Boneh and Franklin [5] have led to an almost exponential volume of research to find novel cryptographic applications of pairings.
At an abstract level, for three groups G 1 , G 2 and G T , a pairing is a function e : G 1 × G 2 → G T that is bilinear and non-degenerate. For cryptographic applications we also need the pairing to be efficiently computable. In concrete settings such cryptographically suitable bilinear pairings can be realized over elliptic curves or, more generally, over hyperelliptic curves and abelian varieties. Naturally the groups G 1 , G 2 and G T as well as the pairing function are constrained by the underlying mathematical structure over which they are defined.
However, as noted by Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [17] , protocol designers sometimes treat the bilinear pairing as a "black box". As a result the designers may gloss over such important structural constraints and the subtleties they introduce in the protocols and their security arguments. This in turn may lead to erroneous or misleading claims about the efficiency and security of pairing-based protocols. For example, protocols employing bilinear pairings sometimes assume that the groups G 1 and G 2 also possess some additional properties such as efficient hashing into G 2 or the existence of an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 . Different types of pairings can be realized that possess the properties required of a particular protocol, but not all protocols can be implemented using the same type of pairing.
This motivated a classification of bilinear pairings into different types based on the concrete structures of the underlying groups [17] . The focus of that work was on three types of pairings where the groups G 1 , G 2 and G T are of the same prime order n. When G 1 = G 2 , the pairing is said to be symmetric (called Type 1 in [17] ). The pairing is asymmetric when G 1 = G 2 . If there is an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 then the pairing is said to be of Type 2; if no such isomorphism is known it is called a Type 3 pairing. In either case no efficiently computable isomorphism from G 1 to G 2 is known.
Symmetric pairings (Type 1) are derived from supersingular (hyper)elliptic curves whereas asymmetric pairings are derived from ordinary curves. Known examples of such pairings are the Weil and Tate pairings and their modifications such as the eta pairing [2] , the ate pairing [22] , and the R-ate pairing [25] .
Cryptographic protocols employing pairings are usually described in the symmetric setting, allowing for a relatively simpler description of the protocol and its security argument. However, current research indicates that, at higher security levels, Type 1 pairings are expected to be slower on many platforms. So from the point of view of efficient implementation, Type 2 and Type 3 are considered better choices. And, for a protocol originally proposed in the symmetric setting, it is usually possible to translate the protocol description and the security argument to the asymmetric setting.
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In the asymmetric setting, current research suggests that Type 3 is overall a better choice [17] . This is because of the reduced cost of pairing evaluation and also the relatively smaller size of elements of G 2 which in turn reduces the cost of other operations such as group operations in G 2 or testing membership in G 2 . The major functional distinctions between the Type 3 and Type 2 settings are that, first of all, in the former it is possible to hash into G 2 , which is infeasible in the latter; and, secondly, whereas there is an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 in Type 2, no such efficiently computable map is known for Type 3. Because in some cases the description of a protocol or its security argument employed the map ψ, it was earlier thought that either such protocols cannot be implemented in Type 3 [17] or a stronger complexity assumption was needed [6, 33] . Contrary to this belief it has been recently argued that any protocol or security argument in Type 2 has a natural, efficient, and secure counterpart in Type 3 [11] . Hence, in the asymmetric setting there appears to be no good reason to use Type 2 instead of Type 3.
However, not all pairing-based protocols available in the literature can be implemented in Type 3 (or Type 2). For example, consider the case of the group signature scheme of Boneh and Shacham [7] with verifier-local revocation. In this protocol a random element of G 2 is first obtained through hashing into G 2 and then one applies the map ψ on this element to obtain the corresponding element of G 1 . As observed in [33] , the protocol cannot be implemented in Type 2 because in that setting we do not have any algorithm to securely hash into G 2 , and furthermore cannot be implemented in Type 3 because in that case we do not know how to compute ψ for a random element of G 2 .
Perhaps realizing this shortcoming of Type 2 (and Type 3), Shacham in his PhD thesis [32] introduced a new kind of pairing. In this setting, while G 1 and G T are cyclic groups of prime order n, G 2 is taken to be a group of exponent n, whose order is some power of n. This was later termed a Type 4 pairing [12, 17] . Like Type 2 and Type 3, a Type 4 pairing can be realized over ordinary elliptic or hyperelliptic curves. But unlike Type 2 or Type 3, here one can both hash into G 2 and also have an efficiently computable homomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 . However, the hashing into G 2 is reported to be quite expensive and there is a small probability that the pairing can be degenerate. The Boneh-Shacham group signature scheme of [7] is described in the Type 4 setting in [32] with a standard reductionist security argument. Several other protocols that use a Type 4 pairing have been proposed [29, 8] based on the Boneh-Shacham scheme. Thus, protocols that require hashing into G 2 followed by an application of ψ can be implemented in the Type 4 setting although the protocol description may require some special care, and as noted in [12] the security argument can become cumbersome.
Protocols such as the Boneh-Shacham group signature scheme [7] can also be easily implemented in Type 1 because here G 1 = G 2 and hashing into G 1 is very efficient. Also recall that most pairing-based protocols were originally proposed in this setting. 2 The main drawback of Type 1 is that the bitlengths of the elements of G 1 will be larger (because of the smaller embedding degrees than what is achievable with asymmetric pairings) and, as a result, pairing computation and operations in G 1 can be expected to be slower at high security levels. However, instructions on next-generation processors such as the forthcoming Intel machines may make Type 1 in characteristic 2 (and 3) fields an attractive choice. Some authors [2, 31] have also proposed to use genus-2 curves in the symmetric setting and use degenerate divisors to speed the pairing computation.
Our contribution. For efficient and secure implementation of the majority of pairing-based protocols it suffices to work in the Type 3 setting. However, as the preceding discussion suggests, we also need to consider the issues of efficient and secure implementation of protocols in the Type 1 and Type 4 settings.
While the question of efficiency does not require any additional justification, we draw attention to the question of security of a cryptographic protocol in these settings for the following reasons. A protocol described in the Type 1 setting which is implemented over a genus-2 curve may require a rewriting of the security argument to check whether the original security assurance is indeed maintained in this setting. Similarly, protocols described in the Type 4 setting may require special scrutiny because of the structure of the group G 2 , in particular its effect on the way the pairing is actually employed in the protocol. In this work we report on both these aspects of efficiency and security in the Type 1 and Type 4 settings. Type 1. Following recent work of Beuchat et al. [3] and Aranha et al. [1] , we provide improved timings for software implementation of Type 1 pairings over elliptic curves in characteristic 2 and characteristic 3 fields. We also report the first pairing timings for supersingular genus-2 curves at the 128-bit security level. We next take a look at the security arguments of some well-known protocols when implemented with these genus-2 curves and with degenerate divisors. Our analysis shows that for the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [6] one needs a new hardness assumption that is trivially equivalent to the security of the scheme. In other words, the reductionist argument does not provide any meaningful assurance about the actual security of the protocol in this setting. A similar analysis is carried out for the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [5] and we observe that here also one needs to modify the original security assumption.
Type 4. As already mentioned, the main motivation for working in Type 4 is that it is possible to hash into G 2 . However, in terms of efficiency that appears to be a major limitation of the Type 4 setting as hashing into G 2 has been reported to be computationally quite expensive [12, 17] . Here we propose a new technique to hash into G 2 which is surprisingly cheap. This method is built upon the shorter representation of elements of G 2 proposed in [10] in the context of the Type 2 setting. We also report the performance benefits that can be obtained for pairing evaluation and other operations involving elements of G 2 in the Type 4 setting. As we have already noted, Type 4 pairings should be carefully used in cryptographic protocols. We show that the Boneh-Shacham group signature scheme as described in Shacham's thesis [32] is trivially insecure. We describe a small modification that appears to restore security. The signature now contains an element of G 2 , however with our new representation of elements of G 2 the corresponding increase in the signature size is not very significant.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we report the pairing computation times in Type 1 when using degenerate divisors in genus-2 curves over characteristic 2 fields at the 128-bit security level and also discuss the security aspects of the BLS signature and Boneh-Franklin IBE schemes in this setting. In §3 we describe the implementation aspects of Type 4 pairings derived from ordinary elliptic curves having even embedding degree and show how one can efficiently hash into G 2 . We then show that the BonehShacham group signature scheme as described [32] is insecure and how a small modification appears to restore security without significant performance penalty.
Notation. In the remainder of this paper, the first component G 1 of the domain of a pairing e :
where E is an elliptic curve defined over F q and J C is the divisor class group of a genus-2 hyperelliptic curve C defined over F q . If e is a Type 1 pairing, then G 2 = G 1 . If e is a Type 2, Type 3 or Type 4 pairing, then G 2 = T, T 0 , E[n], respectively, where E[n] is the n-torsion group of E, T 0 is the Trace-0 subgroup of E[n], and T is any order-n subgroup of E[n] different from G 1 and T 0 ; cf. §3 for further details.
Type 1 pairings on supersingular genus-curves
In this section, we give the context for performance comparisons at the 128-bit security level for pairings based on supersingular genus-2 curves defined over characteristic 2 finite fields against those built on elliptic curves. Security aspects of the BLS signature scheme and the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme are discussed in the genus-2 setting.
Type 1 pairings
We briefly describe three specific symmetric pairings derived from supersingular elliptic and hyperelliptic curves defined over fields of small characteristic; see [2] for details. The elliptic curves E are defined over F 2 1223 and F 3 509 , and have embedding degrees 4 and 6, respectively. The genus-2 curve C is defined over F 2 439 and has embedding degree 12. The pairings are e : [27] . For genus 2, we focus on the most favourable case where the pairing is on degenerate divisors, each of which is essentially a point on the curve. The pairing algorithms given in [2] for the cases under consideration are similar in the sense that there is a "Miller evaluation" loop, followed by an exponentiation in the extension field to select a canonical representative. The final exponentiation is relatively inexpensive, and so the pairing cost can be estimated by counting field multiplications in the main loop. 
. The supersingular elliptic curve E 2 /F 3 509 : y 2 = x 3 − x + 1 has embedding degree 6. We have #E 2 (F 3 509 ) = 7n where n = (3 509 − 3 255 + 1)/7 is an 804-bit prime. The tripling formula is (x, y) → (x 9 − 1, −y 9 ), and hence the cost of tripling a point is relatively small.
The algorithm of Barreto, Galbraith,Ó hÉigeartaigh and Scott [2] for computing the η T pairing has a cost estimate of 255 × 14 = 3570 F q -multiplications. As in the characteristic 2 case, the relatively minor cost of the final exponentiation has been ignored. 
The extension field F q 12 is represented using tower extensions
, where n is an 875-bit prime. The pairing is defined for divisors D = (P 1 ) + (P 2 ) − 2(∞) where P i are points on the curve; however the computation is faster for degenerate divisors where the support consists of a single point [2, 26] . If D = (P )−(∞) is such a degenerate divisor (with P ∈ C(F q )), then it is not necessarily the case that jD is degenerate; however, 8D is degenerate [2] . Furthermore, this octupling is relatively inexpensive, and is given by 8D = (φπ 6 P ) − (∞) where π(x, y) = (x 2 , y 2 ) and φ(x, y) = (x + 1, y + x 2 + 1). Exploiting this octupling, the algorithm in [2] for η T on degenerate divisors has an approximate cost of 219 · 69 = 15111 F q -multiplications (see [30] for additional details).
Comparisons. Barreto et al. [2] give experimental data for pairing times at the "950-bit" and "1230-bit" security levels, where the level is in terms of the bitsize of the extension field F q k . Times (in milliseconds) for the η T pairing in the 1230-bit case on a 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4 are given in Table 1 . Table 1 . Times (in milliseconds) from [2] for the ηT pairing at the "1230-bit security level" on a 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4. Their work shows significant incentive to use genus-2 curves in the case that the pairing is on degenerate divisors. However, field multiplication for F 2 103 exploited 128-bit single-instruction multiple-data (SIMD) registers on the Pentium 4, while the other fields used only 32-bit registers. The rationale for limiting the wide registers to the genus-2 case was that "Great potential savings can be realized if an element of the base field can be represented in a single machine word, rather than using a multi-precision representation" and a factor 2 acceleration was reported for field multiplication via the wide registers.
This difference in implementations is especially significant since the Pentium 4 is 32-bit. The techniques are perhaps less elegant when applied to larger fields, but similar acceleration can be obtained via wide registers for the fields in the other pairings. For example, [20] examined the acceleration offered by SIMD registers for pairings at a higher security level using the fields F 2 1223 and F 3 509 , but did not consider an example from genus 2. Beuchat et al. [3] and Aranha et al. [1] subsequently demonstrated significantly faster field arithmetic on platforms considered in [20] .
In short, the implementation techniques for the times in [2] favour the genus-2 curve. If the registers used in F 2 103 were applied to F 2 307 , then we would expect that the pairing times would be significantly closer. On the other hand, we are interested in the 128-bit security level, where the higher embedding degree of the genus-2 curve is an advantage. Our intent here is to give a meaningful comparison at the 128-bit security level among the various pairings on a "reference platform" using whatever methods are believed to be fastest in each scenario. The Pentium 4 is no longer of primary interest, and so we chose the popular 64-bit Intel Core2.
Timings for our implementations appear in Table 2 . Pairings for the BarretoNaehrig (BN) curve (see §3.1) over a prime field are expected to be fastest at this security level, in part because the embedding degree is 12 and the platform possesses a relatively fast integer multiplier on 64-bit operands. Details on this timing using the MIRACL library appear in [20] .
Beuchat et al. [3] discuss optimization strategies and set benchmarks for pairing times in the elliptic curve cases over characteristic 2 and 3. As in [1] , a focus is on parallelizing the pairing computation, although the times for a single-core computation were also impressive. The times in Table 2 are faster, but are consistent in the sense that characteristic 3 offers an advantage. On the other hand, this advantage is not as large as in [3] , mainly due to the difference in characteristic 2 multiplication. Compared with [2] , applying the wide registers across fields has narrowed differences. Genus 2 has lost much of the performance advantage, although it may still be attractive from an implementation and keysize perspective for protocols having pairings on degenerate divisors. The gap between the pairing from the BN curve and those over characteristic 2 and 3 is perhaps narrower than expected. The experimental data in Table 1 gives a factor 3.4 penalty for a pairing on general divisors. In special cases, the cost will be less. Nondegenerate divisors (P 1 ) + (P 2 ) − 2(∞) are of two forms, either P i ∈ C(F q ) or P 1 and P 2 are conjugates in C(F q 2 ) \ C(F q ). A pairing on divisors can be calculated as a product of pairings on points; e.g., in the case where P i ∈ C(F q ), η T ((P 1 ) + (P 2 ) − 2(∞), (P ) − (∞)) = η T (P 1 , P )η T (P 2 , P ) at twice the cost of a pairing on degenerate divisors. However, this approach may not be the most efficient when points lie in C(F q 2 ) \ C(F q ) [2] . Lee and Lee [26] give explicit formulas for the pairing on general divisors, with estimated cost (from field multiplications, where an F q 12 -multiplication is counted as 45 F q -multiplications) as a factor 4 over the pairing on degenerate divisors.
Implementation notes. Compared with [3] and [20] , the characteristic 2 multiplier (described in [1] ) uses twice as much data-dependent precomputation but fewer shift operations. Some of the improvement against [20] was achieved by reducing the number of move operations (a weakness underestimated in [20] ), although a portion of the acceleration was obtained by exploiting a shift operation introduced with the Supplemental Streaming SIMD Extension 3 (SSSE3). than in characteristic 2, but field multiplication performs more shifting. Multiplication for F 2 1223 is via one application of Karatsuba where elements are split at 616 bits (a multiple of 8 that allows fast shifting and eliminates the "fixup" required in combing on n-word input when both inputs have length greater than nW − w for word-length W and comb width w). Multiplication in the 439-bit field is via combing directly on field elements. Combing uses two tables, each of 16 elements.
The strategies for characteristic 2 and 3 are similar, in part because an F 3 -element is represented as a pair (a 0 , a 1 ) of bits and addition involves only bitwise operations. Harrison et al. [21] proposed an addition using 7 xor (⊕) and or (∨) operations via the sequence:
The number of operations was reduced to 6 by Kawahara et al. [24] who reported 7-8% improvement in field multiplication on an AMD Opteron (a processor similar to the Intel Core2) using "non-standard" encodings of F 3 -elements. They also gave a 6-operation addition in the encoding suggested by [21] using xor and andn (x ∧ȳ).
The SIMD instruction set on the Core2 includes andn, although Beuchat et al. [3] reported that the 7-op addition "consistently yields a shorter computation time" than the 6-op variant with andn, and speculated that andn on the Core2 "is implemented less efficiently" than xor and or. However, these instructions have the same timings [14] , and our experimental data is that field multiplication is faster with the 6-op variant. We suspect that the discrepancy is due to register allocation strategy in the accumulation portion of the multiplication method. A variation on the formulation in [21] is proposed in [3] : t ← (a 0 ∨a 1 )∧(b 0 ∨b 1 ), c 0 ← (a 0 ∨b 0 )⊕t, c 1 ← (a 1 ∨b 1 )⊕t. Specifics are not given on why this resulted in faster code, but we note that it permits simpler register tracking in the accumulation portion of field multiplication and has one operation on accumulator registers only. In this sense, the formulation in [21] and the 6-op variant for c ← c + b are less pleasant. Compilers can be quite sensitive to the precise form of the code; however, the 6-op variant can be coded without increasing dependency chains, and we expect this formulation to be fastest provided that unnecessary moves are avoided. Experimentally, we observed roughly 10% faster times for field multiplication.
As in [3] , we use the loop-unrolling technique of [19] along with the F 3 6m multiplication of [18] (requiring 15 multiplications and 67 additions in F 3 m ) to accelerate the pairing computation in characteristic 3. This reduces the cost from 14 to an effective 12.5 F 3 m multiplications in each iteration of the Miller loop. Some incremental accelerations noted in [3] were not implemented; for example, a few tables of precomputation in the evaluation loop of the pairing computation can be reused (a width-4 comb requires 81 elements of precomputation, although half are obtained by simple negation).
Timings were done on a 2.4 GHz Intel Core2-quad running Sun Solaris, using the GNU C 4.1 compiler with some fragments written in assembly. Most of the SIMD operations are via intrinsics, with SSSE3 instructions accessed via assembly.
Security of protocols using degenerate divisors
The principal motivation for considering hyperelliptic curves and degenerate divisors for pairing-based protocols is to speed the pairing computation at higher security levels. Naturally we need the assurance that the protocol, when implemented in this setting, maintains its original security guarantee. The question of security received some attention in [15, 2] , however the main emphasis in those works is on efficient pairing computation. Here we take a closer look at the security argument of two well-known protocols when implemented in the setting of §2.1.
BLS signature scheme. We first describe the BLS signature scheme [6] using symmetric pairings (Type 1). We then present two variants of the scheme depending upon which particular elements are chosen to be degenerate and examine the resulting effect on the security argument.
Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G T be a Type 1 pairing on a genus-2 curve, and let H : {0, 1} * → G 1 be a hash function. Let P 1 be a generator of G 1 . The public parameters of the system are G 1 , G T , H, P 1 .
Alice's private key is an integer x ∈ R [0, n − 1] and her corresponding public key is X = xP 1 . To sign a message M , Alice computes Q = H(M ) and then σ = xQ as her signature on M . To verify, Bob computes Q = H(M ) and accepts σ as a valid signature on M if and only if e(σ, P 1 ) = e(Q, X).
(
Correctness of the verification algorithm follows because of the bilinearity property of e, i.e., e(σ, P 1 ) = e(xQ, P 1 ) = e(Q, xP 1 ) = e(Q, X).
Security of the scheme is based on the hardness of the computational DiffieHellman problem (DHP) in G 1 assuming H to be a random oracle. Recall that the DHP in G 1 = P 1 is the following: given X (where X = xP 1 for some x ∈ R [0, n − 1]) and Q ∈ R G 1 , compute xQ. The essential ideas behind the reductionist security argument are as follows. Given a DHP instance (X, Q), the simulator sets the challenge public key as X and runs the BLS adversary A. The simulator responds to all hash queries H(M ) made by A, except for a randomly chosen distinguished query, by selecting a ∈ R [0, n − 1] and setting H(M ) = aP 1 ; the response to the distinguished hash query H(M * ) is H(M * ) = Q. The simulator responds to signing queries M = M * by setting σ = aX. If A eventually produces a forged signature σ * on M * , then the simulator has been successful in obtaining the solution σ * to the DHP instance (X, Q). Recall from §2.1 that C is a supersingular genus-2 curve over F q , q = 2 m , and G 1 is the set of n-torsion points in J C (F q ) where n ≈ q 2 is prime. Let D be the set of degenerate divisors in G 1 ; then #D ≈ q since #C(F q ) ≈ q. For efficient implementation we would like to have some (if possible all) of the elements of G 1 used in the protocol to lie in D. However, the choice is constrained by how these elements are actually generated in the protocol, and whether the protocol environment can be properly simulated in the security argument. We further elaborate on these issues based on the following two versions of BLS. We use calligraphic fonts for degenerate divisors to distinguish them from general divisors.
BLS-1a:
The key generation algorithm chooses a random element P 1 of D as the system parameter and a hash function H : {0, 1} * → D. Both these tasks can be accomplished without any security penalty and is as efficient as working in the elliptic curve setting.
5 Then, with overwhelming probability, Alice's public key xP 1 will not be a degenerate divisor. Since the range of H is D, Q = H(M ) is a degenerate divisor. But σ = xQ will likely be non-degenerate (with overwhelming probability). As a result, one of the arguments in each of the two pairing computations in the verification equation (1) is a degenerate divisor while the other is non-degenerate. This still makes the pairing computation faster compared to the case when both arguments are general divisors.
Next we investigate to what extent the original security argument of BLS is applicable in the case of BLS-1a. The DHP (with respect to the generator P 1 of G 1 ) is the problem of determining xQ, given X = xP 1 ∈ G 1 for some unknown x ∈ R [0, n − 1] and Q ∈ R G 1 . The natural choice would be to argue security of BLS-1a based on the hardness of the following variant of DHP. Given X = xP 1 ∈ G 1 for some unknown x ∈ R [0, n − 1] and Q ∈ R D, compute xQ -we call this problem DHP * . The following shows that DHP and DHP * are computationally equivalent. Proof. It is clear that DHP * reduces to DHP. To prove the converse, suppose that we are given a DHP instance (X, Q) and an oracle for solving DHP * . If Q ∈ D then the DHP * -oracle can be used to compute xQ. If Q ∈ D, say Q = (P 1 )+(P 2 )−2(∞), there are two cases to consider. Let us say that Q is of type A if P 1 , P 2 ∈ C(F q ) and of type B if P 1 , P 2 ∈ C(F q 2 ) \ C(F q ). Suppose first that Q is of type A. This case can be recognized because the Mumford representation (see [28] ) of Q will take the form (a, b), where a, b ∈ F q [x] with deg(a) = 2, deg(b) ≤ 1, and where the roots of a belong to F q . More explicitly, if a(x) = (x − u 1 )(x − u 2 ) with u 1 , u 2 ∈ F q , then P 1 = (u 1 , v 1 ) and P 2 = (u 2 , v 2 ) where v 1 = b(u 1 ) and v 2 = b(u 2 ). Thus, we can efficiently write Q = Q 1 + Q 2 , where Q 1 = (P 1 ) − (∞) and Q 2 = (P 2 ) − (∞) are degenerate divisors. The DHP * -oracle can then be used to compute xQ 1 and xQ 2 , from which xQ = xQ 1 + xQ 2 is immediately obtained.
5 In [16, §7] the concern was raised that hashing to the set of degenerate divisors in JC (Fq) instead of to the set of general divisors can lead to a loss security. This is because hash collisions in the former case can be found in O(q 1/2 ) time using generic algorithms, whereas collision finding in the latter case takes O(q) time. However, the concern is not an issue in our setting with q = 2 439 because then √ q ≈ 2 219 which is significantly greater than the target security level of 2 128 .
Suppose now that Q is of type B. In this case, we can multiply Q by randomlyselected integers ℓ ∈ [1, n − 1] until the resulting divisor Q ′ is of type A. The expected number of trials is 2, since the number of type A divisors in J C (F q ) is approximately q 2 /2, as is the number of type B divisors in J C (F q ) (this follows because #C(F q ) ≈ q and #C(F q 2 ) ≈ q 2 ). As above, one can then compute xQ ′ and hence xQ = ℓ −1 (xQ ′ ). Now, given a DHP * instance (X, Q), the simulator sets the challenge public key as X and interacts with the BLS-1a adversary A. To properly answer A's signing query on a message M , the simulator has to "program" the random oracle in such a way that it outputs some H ∈ R D for which the simulator knows the discrete log with respect to P 1 . Recall that this was trivially accomplished for the original protocol -the simulator first chose a ∈ R [0, n−1] and then returned aP 1 . However, to apply this strategy in the simulation of BLS-1a, the simulator must satisfy the additional constraint that aP 1 lies in D.
The simulator could easily satisfy this condition if given some fixed P ∈ D she has some mechanism to choose a random a such that aP also belongs to D. The only known way to guarantee this in our genus-2 setting is to choose a to be a power of 8, i.e., if P ∈ D then 8 i P is also a degenerate divisor for any integer i. However, as the following lemma indicates, the hash output will then be confined to an extremely small subset of D (and thus the simulation will fail).
Lemma 2. Let P be a degenerate divisor of order n in J C (F q ), where C is the supersingular genus-2 curve over F q (with q = 2 m ) defined in §2.1. Then there are exactly 4m degenerate divisors of the form 8 i P.
Proof. We have q 12 ≡ 1 (mod n), and so 8 4m ≡ 1 (mod n). Hence, the order of 8 modulo n is in {1, 2, 4, m, 2m, 4m}. Since n > 8 4 , 8 m ≡ 1 (mod n) and 8 2m ≡ 1 (mod n), the order of 8 modulo n must be 4m.
One way to circumvent this problem is to define a new problem which we call DHP * with oracle access and denote by DHP * O . In addition to the DHP * instance X = xP 1 and Q, the solver (i.e., the BLS-1a simulator in the present context) is given access to an oracle O. Each time it is invoked, the oracle O returns a random P ∈ D along with xP. It is easy to argue that the security of BLS1a is equivalent to the hardness of DHP * O . For example, when reducing DHP * O to the problem of breaking BLS-1a, the simulator returns P when A queries the random oracle on some message M , and subsequently xP in response to a signature query on M (where the simulator obtains (P, xP) from its oracle O). At some point, A returns a valid forgery on some message M * whose hash value has been set to Q. The simulator returns this signature as the solution to the given DHP * O instance. However, there is a circularity in the whole argument -the assumption that it is hard to solve DHP * O is nothing but a rephrasing of the assertion that it is hard to forge a BLS-1a signature. Currently we do not know any way out of this circularity based on the known security argument for BLS. Neither is there any evidence to suggest that BLS-1a is insecure. Remark 1. Let P be a degenerate divisor of order n in J C (F q ) with n ≈ q 2 , and let D denote the set of all degenerate divisors in P . The set of degeneracypreserving multipliers is DPM = {ℓ ∈ [0, n − 1] : ℓP ∈ D}. Lemma 2 says that {8 i mod n : 0 ≤ i < 4m} ⊆ DPM, while one would expect that #DPM ≈ n/q. The interesting question is whether one can efficiently select an integer uniformly at random from DPM. If yes, then it easy to see that DHP * and DHP * O are computationally equivalent, and thus the security of BLS-1a can be proven based on the assumptions that DHP is hard and that H is a random function.
BLS-1b:
Alternatively, we can keep the range of the hash function H to be G 1 and choose only the fixed system parameter P 1 to be a degenerate divisor. With this modification, we still make some efficiency gains in the verification algorithm namely in the evaluation of e(σ, P 1 ). The known security argument for BLS with respect to DHP can now be easily adapted for BLS-1b.
Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption scheme. The situation is similar for the BF-IBE scheme [5] . We assume the reader is familiar with the basic idea of the protocol. Suppose that the public parameters are G 1 , G T , H, P 1 , the Key Generation Centre's public key is D pub ∈ G 1 , and the public key corresponding to an arbitrary identity ID is obtained as Q ID = H(ID). Encryption involves the computation of a pairing value e(D pub , Q ID ). The hardness of BF-IBE is based on the so-called bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem -given aP 1 , bP 1 , cP 1 for a, b, c ∈ R [0, n − 1], compute e(P 1 , P 1 ) abc . In [2] , Barreto et al. suggest that without loss of security it is possible to choose both D pub and Q ID to be degenerate divisors so that encryption involves pairing of two degenerate divisors. We note that the known security argument of BF-IBE suffers from the same problem that we encountered in BLS-1a, namely it is not possible to simulate the random oracle H with range D. The security argument does however go through if one chooses only D pub to be degenerate. Now in the encryption algorithm only one of the arguments to the pairing function is a degenerate divisor while the other is a general divisor. In this case, the corresponding instance of the BDH problem contains one degenerate divisor and two general divisors. As was done in Lemma 1, one can prove that this variant of BDH is equivalent to the original BDH problem.
Remark 2. We have not found any pairing-based protocols in the literature that can be implemented so that both arguments to one or more of the pairing functions are degenerate divisors, and where the original security argument in the elliptic curve setting can be carried over to the genus-2 setting. Thus, the speed benefits of using pairings in the genus-2 setting where both arguments are degenerate divisors do not seem to be directly applicable to known protocols.
Type 4 pairings
Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over the finite field F q . Let n be a prime divisor of #E(F q ) satisfying gcd(n, q) = 1, and let k (the embedding degree) be the smallest positive integer such that n | q k − 1. We will assume that k is even. Since k > 1, we have E[n] ⊆ E(F q k ). We will further assume that n 3 ∤ #E(F q k ). Let G T be the order-n subgroup of F * q k . The (full) Tate pairing is a non-degenerate bilinear functionê : E[n] × E[n] → G T and can be defined as follows:ê (P, Q) = f n,P (Q + R) f n,P (R)
where R ∈ E(F q k ) with R ∈ {∞, P, −Q, P − Q}, and where the Miller function f n,P is a function whose only zeros and poles in E are a zero of order n at P and a pole of order n at ∞.
. If the first component of the domain ofê is restricted to G 1 , then the definition ofê : 
, where π denotes the q-th power Frobenius, is an efficiently-computable homomorphism from E[n] to G 1 . The kernel of Tr, called the Trace-0 group, is an order-n subgroup of E[n]. Hashing onto G 1 can be efficiently computed by first hashing to an x-coordinate of E(F q ), then solving a quadratic equation over F q to find the corresponding y-coordinate, and finally multiplying the resulting point by the cofactor h 1 = #E(F q )/n to obtain an n-torsion point. Hashing onto E[n] can be accomplished in a similar fashion, by first hashing onto a random point in E(F q k ) and then multiplying by the cofactor h k = #E(F q k )/n 2 . However, hashing onto E[n] is considerably more expensive than hashing onto G 1 since computations now take place in the larger field F q k instead of in F q , and moreover the cofactor h k ≈ q k−2 can be quite large. For the case of BN curves, Chen, Cheng and Smart [12] estimated that the cost of hashing onto E[n] is about 540 times that of performing a point multiplication in G 1 (and estimated the cost of hashing onto G 1 as "free"). This expensive hashing is a major drawback of Type 4 pairings. In the next section, we show that the representation for E[n] introduced in [10] can be used to speed hashing into E[n]. In particular, for the case of BN curves, we estimate that our new method for hashing into E[n] is less than 3 times as costly as a point multiplication in G 1 .
On efficient implementation
Following [17] , we denote by D the CM discriminant of E and set
and d = k/e. Then E has a unique degree-e twistẼ defined over F q d such that n | #Ẽ(F q d ) [22] . LetP 2 ∈Ẽ(F q d ) be a point of order n, and letT 0 = P 2 . Then there is a monomorphism φ :
The group T 0 = P 2 is the Trace-0 subgroup of E[n]. The monomorphism φ can be defined so that φ :T 0 → T 0 can be efficiently computed in both directions; therefore we can identifyT 0 and T 0 , and consequently T 0 can be viewed as having coordinates in
Then it is easy to verify that Q − ψ(Q) ∈ T 0 for all Q ∈ E[n] and consequently the map ρ :
is an efficiently-computable isomorphism, whose inverse, given by (Q 1 , Q 2 ) → Q 1 +Q 2 , is also efficiently computable. Hence, without loss of generality, the elements of E[n] can be represented as pairs of points (Q 1 , Q 2 ), where Q 1 ∈ G 1 and Q 2 ∈ T 0 .
With this representation for E[n], hashing onto E[n] can be defined as H(m) = (H 1 (m), H 2 (m)), where H 1 and H 2 are hash functions with ranges G 1 and T 0 , respectively. This is expected to be faster than the conventional hashing method outlined in the beginning of this section because hashing onto G 1 and T 0 requires arithmetic in F q and F q d , respectively, rather than in F q k . Observe that if H 1 and H 2 are modeled as random oracles, then H is also a random oracle.
The ate [22] and R-ate [25] pairings are fast Type 3 pairings from G 1 × T 0 to G T defined by e 3 (P, Q) =ê(Q, P ) N for some fixed integer N . Now, define the Type 4 pairing e 4 :
Thus, e 4 is a bilinear pairing and can be computed in essentially the same time as the Type 3 pairing e 3 . The pairing e 4 is non-degenerate in the sense that (i) for each P ∈ G 1 \ {∞}, there exists Q ∈ E[n] such that e 4 (P, Q) = 1; and (ii) for each Q ∈ E[n] \ G 1 , there exists P ∈ G 1 such that e 4 (P, Q) = 1.
Remark 3. In cryptographic applications of Type 4 pairings, one can ensure that hash values H(m) = (H 1 (m), H 2 (m)) do not lie in G 1 or T 0 by defining H 1 and H 2 to have ranges G 1 \ {∞} and T 0 \ {∞}, respectively. This ensures that ψ(H(m)) = ∞ and e 4 (P, H(m)) = 1 for P = ∞.
For concreteness, we consider the BN curve E/F p : Y 2 = X 2 + 3 with BN parameters z = 6000000000001F2D that was studied in [10] . This curve has the property that n = #E(F p ) is a 256-bit prime, and the embedding degree is k = 12. For this particular curve, Table 3 lists the bitlengths of elements in G 1 , T 0 , E[n] and G T , and the estimated costs of performing essential operations in these groups; for detailed explanations see [10] . Table 3 demonstrates that Type 4 pairings have very similar performance attributes as Type 3 pairings.
On secure implementation
As we have observed earlier, the only motivation to consider the Type 4 setting for implementation of a protocol is when the protocol requires hashing into the second component G 2 of the pairing's domain followed by an application of ψ on the hash output. However, for Type 4 pairings, G 2 = E[n] has order n 2 , which 
Hashing into G1 315m 315m can be a fundamental distinction affecting the functionality and security of a protocol in the Type 4 setting. We demonstrate this with the very first protocol for which the Type 4 setting was introduced in the literature.
Boneh-Shacham group signature scheme. In a group signature scheme every member of the group has a secret key but there is a single public key for the entire group. The signer-anonymity property of such a scheme finds application, for example, in privacy preserving attestation [7] . Revocation of a user may be critical for such an application, e.g., when the user's secret key is compromised. Boneh and Shacham proposed a short group signature scheme [7] with an interesting property that given a list of revoked users a verifier can locally check whether the signature has been generated by one of them. This is called a verifierlocal revocation (VLR) group signature. They defined a security model for VLR group signature, proposed a construction based on asymmetric pairings, provided a security proof, and discussed the efficiency of the scheme in the elliptic curve setting.
The original description [7] of the Boneh-Shacham group signature scheme (BS-VLR) includes a hash function whose range is G 2 × G 2 and also employs the map ψ on the components of the outputs of this hash function. As noted elsewhere [33, 11] , this protocol cannot be implemented in either the Type 2 or the Type 3 setting. Later in his Ph.D. thesis [32] , Shacham introduced Type 4 pairings and reproduced the BS-VLR scheme in that setting without further modification.
Here we take another look at the BS-VLR scheme from [32] and demonstrate that the protocol as described does not achieve its desired functionality and in fact is not secure. The protocol description is quite involved and so is its security proof. We recall only those parts of the protocol that are relevant to our discussion. Interested readers are referred to §7.4 of Shacham's thesis [32] as well as the original paper of Boneh and Shacham [7] for the elaborate details.
BS-VLR group signature scheme: The protocol employs a Type 4 pairing e : G 1 × E[n] → G T . In order to maintain consistency with [7, 32] , we use multiplicative notation for G 1 and E[n]. The group public key is gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , w) , where g 2 ∈ R E[n], g 1 = ψ(g 2 ), and w = g . The revocation token corresponding to this private key is A i which is made public in a revocation list (RL) when membership of i is revoked from the group.
The signer i computes, among other items, two elements T 1 , T 2 ∈ G 1 in the following way:
where M is the message to be signed, r ∈ R [1, n − 1] is a nonce, and H 0 is a hash function with range E[n] × E[n] (treated as a random oracle in the security proof); cf. Remark 3. 2. u ← ψ(û) and v ← ψ(v).
T 1 , T 2 and r are then sent as part of the group signature σ on M . Note that given r, the verifier can easily obtainû andv. Verification is a two-step procedure -signature check and revocation check. The signature is accepted as valid only if both these checks are successful. We do not describe the first step where the verifier performs the standard check for validity of the signature σ on M under the group public key gpk. The insecurity of the protocol lies in the revocation check step, which we reproduce verbatim from [32] .
Revocation check. For each element A ∈ RL, check whether A is encoded in (T 1 , T 2 ) by checking if
If no element of RL is encoded in (T 1 , T 2 ), the signer of σ has not been revoked.
In other words, suppose the group member i who generated the signature has already been revoked, i.e., A i ∈ RL. Then for A = A i , the left side of (4) becomes e(T 2 /A i ,û) = e(v α ,û) = e(v,û) α , while the right side becomes
It is assumed that e(v,û) α and e(u,v) α are equal, in which case equation (4) holds. As a result the verifier can link the signature to the revoked member i and hence reject it.
In fact, for a signature generated by a revoked user, equation (4) trivially holds if we are in the Type 2 or Type 3 settings where G 1 and G 2 are cyclic groups of the same prime order n. (Simply writeû =v x for some x ∈ [0, n − 1], and note that u = ψ(û) = ψ(v x ) = v x .) But recall that the protocol is now described in the Type 4 setting where G 2 = E[n] is a group of order n 2 . Notice that E[n] has n + 1 different subgroups of order n, two of which are G 1 and T 0 . Suppose that T is any order-n subgroup of E[n] other than G 1 and T 0 . In the Type 4 setting, ifû andv are in the same subgroup T, then equation (4) holds. Conversely, ifû andv are in different subgroups T, then equation (4) only holds with negligible probability. However,û andv are obtained through hashing to random points in E[n], and so the probability that they both belong to the same subgroup T is negligible. In fact, the inability to deterministically hash to a particular subgroup T is the sole reason to describe the protocol in the Type 4 setting instead of Type 2. So with an overwhelming probability equation (4) will not be satisfied and a signature generated by the revoked member i will pass the revocation check.
The security definition of the BS-VLR signature scheme requires that the protocol must satisfy the correctness, traceability, and selfless-anonymity properties, of which the first two are relevant to our discussion. Informally speaking, correctness means that every properly generated signature is accepted as valid if and only if the corresponding signer is not revoked, whereas traceability means that an adversary should not be able to forge a signature that cannot be traced to a revoked user. Neither of these is satisfied for the BS-VLR signature scheme as we have already explained. The wrong assertion in Theorem 7.4.4 of [32] regarding the correctness of the scheme renders the proof of Theorem 7.4.8 regarding traceability meaningless.
Modified BS-VLR signature scheme in Type 4: We now describe a small modification to the protocol that appears to restore security. One apparent drawback is that the signature in the modified protocol contains an element of E[n] and may no longer be considered as "short", which was one of the original motivations of the construction. Fortunately, our new representation of E[n] as discussed in §3.1 (cf. Table 3 ) helps to maintain the relatively small signature length.
To begin with, we note that the problem with the original protocol [32] does not stem from any intrinsic structural weakness. Rather, it is because of a technical issue related to the structure of G 2 . For example, it is possible to securely implement the protocol in the Type 1 setting (where G 2 = G 1 ) though the signature length increases. To keep this length short one has to work in the asymmetric setting; and since the protocol requires both hashing into G 2 and the map ψ, the only known option is Type 4. However, that means G 2 is no longer a cyclic group of prime order n, but a group of order n 2 . Hence, we cannot expect that two (or more) randomly generated elements will lie in the same order-n subgroup T of G 2 .
Keeping this in mind, the problem of the BS-VLR signature scheme in Type 4 can be easily fixed with a simple modification. The essential idea is the following. Forû,v ∈ R E[n], even though in general one cannot expect that e(ψ(v),û) will be equal to e(ψ(û),v), bilinearity of e ensures that
for all α ∈ [0, n − 1]. So we make the following changes to the protocol.
1. The key generation algorithm remains unchanged. But note that g 2 is a random order-n element of E[n] which can be obtained by hashing into E[n] as discussed in §3.1. 
The hash function
The only noticeable differences with the original scheme is that the signature now containsT 1 ∈ E[n] instead of T 1 ∈ G 1 and the revocation check is performed based onT 1 . We briefly analyze the resulting effect on the security. It is easy to check that the modified scheme satisfies the correctness property. For a signature generated by an honest user, the original argument of Theorem 7.4.4 in [32] applies whenT 1 (and not T 1 ) is sent as part of the signature. In particular, for a signature generated by a revoked member, equation (6) is exactly in the form of (5) and hence that signature will not pass the revocation check and will be rejected.
The selfless-anonymity and traceability properties of the original scheme are established through involved reductionist security arguments in Lemma 7.4.7 and Theorem 7.4.8 of [32] . Recall that the traceability property is violated because the correctness property does not hold for the original scheme. In fact we do not find any flaw per se in the proofs of these two theorems if we assume that G 2 is a group of prime order n.
However, in the Type 4 setting G 2 is the set of all n-torsion points E[n], which is a group of order n 2 . Still it is possible to carry over the original security arguments with some modifications. We do not reproduce the complete arguments here but only emphasize that in the selfless-anonymity game (Lemma 7.4.7) the following variant of the Decision Linear problem should be used: Given a 6-tuple
Furthermore, the elements u 0 and u 1 have to be appropriately randomized when answering signature queries on behalf of users i 0 and i 1 . This randomization is possible because elements of E[n] can be represented as described in §3.1. A complete description of the modified protocol and arguments for its security are provided in the Appendix.
We have identified two other protocols in the literature that extend or apply the idea of the BS-VLR signature scheme. These are the VLR signature with backward unlinkability due to Nakanishi and Funabiki [29] and the remote biometric authentication protocol due to Bringer et al. [8] . All our observations regarding the BS-VLR scheme apply to these protocols as well.
Protocols that employ asymmetric pairings and which utilize hashing into G 2 followed by an application of the map ψ can only be instantiated in the Type 4 setting. In fact, to the best of our understanding, one should only resort to Type 4 for these kinds of protocols, since any other protocol employing an asymmetric pairing can be more efficiently instantiated in the Type 3 setting. However, when describing a protocol in the Type 4 setting or arguing its security, protocol designers should be cautious of the fact that G 2 is no longer a primeorder group like G 1 or G T . Not doing so may critically affect the functionality and security of the protocol as illustrated by the examination of BS-VLR.
Concluding remarks
We presented the first timings for Type 1 pairings derived from supersingular genus-2 curves in characteristic 2 at the 128-bit level, and showed that hashing to the group G 2 in Type 4 pairings is not nearly as costly as previously believed. Furthermore, we demonstrated some pitfalls that can arise when designing protocols and formulating reductionist security arguments in the Type 1 and Type 4 settings.
Correctness. This property mandates that, for all (gpk, gsk, grt) generated by KeyGen algorithm, every signature generated by Sign algorithm should verify as valid, except when the signer is revoked. Formally,
In the modified protocol, a signature is accepted as valid in the first verification phase if the output of H equals c. A signature includes all the inputs to H except R 1 , R 2 ,R 3 which are rederived by the verifier as follows. So only a valid signature will be accepted in the first phase (except with a negligible probability of hash collision). Now, a signature is rejected in the second phase when e(T 2 /A,û) = e(v,T 1 ) for some A ∈ RL. This happens only if A is used in the generation of the signature component T 2 .
Selfless-anonymity. The selfless-anonymity property is established through a game between a challenger and an adversary. In this game, the adversary's goal is to determine which of two users of her choosing generated a signature. She is not given access to the private key of any of these two users.
The selfless-anonymity property of the modified protocol can be established through a reductionist argument. In particular, given an adversary A that wins the selfless-anonymity game one can construct an algorithm B that solves the following variant of the Decision Linear problem in E[n] and G 1 .
B is given a 6-tuple (u 0 , u 1 , h 0 = u . Given this Decision Linear problem instance, B simulates the protocol environment for A to play the selfless-anonymity game.
Setup:
1. B picks g 2 ∈ R E[n] and sets g 1 = ψ(g 2 ). B also picks γ ∈ R [1, n − 1] and sets w = g γ 2 and gives A the group public key gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , w). -Signing query: Given a message M ∈ {0, 1} * and user i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 } B proceeds as follows.
• . For simplicity assume that B does not abort the game. We obtain a perfect simulation of the selfless-anonymity game when Z is a random element of G 1 . On the other hand, when Z = v a+b 0 both i * 0 and i * 1 have the same private key and so the bit β is information theoretically hidden from A. Hence any adversary A with an advantage ǫ in the selfless-anonymity game can be used to construct an algorithm B that solves the Decision Linear problem with advantage ǫ/2.
Traceability. A VLR group signature scheme is traceable if no adversary can win the traceability game as defined in [7, 32] . Informally speaking, the adversary's goal in this game is to produce a valid nontrivial signature that cannot be traced to one of the users in her coalition (i.e., users corrupted by the adversary).
The traceability property is established in [7, 32] by an involved reductionist argument that proceeds through several stages. First an interaction framework is described for simulating the protocol environment for an adversary A that wins the traceability game. Next it is shown how one can instantiate this framework appropriately to obtain a solution to an instance of the underlying strong DiffieHellman (SDH) problem. We note that the original argument carries over for the modified protocol when the interaction framework is described to simulate the modified protocol. In particular, each query to the random oracle H 0 returnŝ u, v ∈ E[n] × G 1 and the signature component T 1 ∈ G 1 in the original argument is replaced byT 1 ∈ E[n] in the simulation for the modified protocol.
